



**Peacemaking Advisory Group
– Cabo Delgado (PAG-CD)**

Stakeholder Consultations Report

February 2023

About the PAG

Objective

The purpose of the Peacemaking Advisory Group (PAG) is to create a safe and non-partisan platform for discussion and consultation between critical stakeholders based on mutual respect and ubuntu, to deescalate intercommunal tensions and unlock the development potential of the Province of Cabo Delgado.

Membership

The PAG is a regional initiative that is politically neutral and harnesses the experience and expertise of its members to support peace and development in Southern Africa through listening and dialogue.

The PAG is chaired by Bishop Trevor Mwamba, Bishop of the Anglican Church and President of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in the Republic of Zambia, and comprises the following members:

- Bishop Dinis Matsolo, President of the Justice, Peace, and Reconciliation Commission of Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) and Executive Director of Programa Inter-Religioso Contra a Malaria (PIRCOM), Republic of Mozambique.
- Mr Chris Maroleng, Global Advisor and Executive Director of Good Governance Africa, Republic of South Africa.
- Ambassador Roeland van de Geer, Chairman of the European Board of Good Governance Africa and former Ambassador of the Netherlands to the Republic of Mozambique.
- Ms Alice Mogwe, Executive Director of DITSHWANELO - The Botswana Centre for Human Rights and President of the International Federation for Human Rights
- Ms Fatma Karume, leading Human Rights Lawyer, United Republic of Tanzania.

The PAG has the support of an Eminent Persons Group (EPG), in the process of being established, and will comprise distinguished leaders from the region.

The PAG secretariat is based in Johannesburg, South Africa at Good Governance Africa (GGA), a registered non-profit organisation focused on researching, advocating, and improving governance across the African continent with additional offices in Accra, Addis Ababa, and Lagos.

Our logo

PAG's logo is based on Mpatapo, a symbol image from the Adinkra, a system of symbols from Ghana in West Africa. It represents the bond or knot that binds parties in a reconciliation after a dispute. It is a symbol of peacemaking after strife.



1. Summary Overview

Since October 2017, Cabo Delgado, a province in northern Mozambique, has seen sustained armed conflict, fought between a Non-State Armed Group (NSAG), *Al-Shabaab*¹ and the government of Mozambique, with support from regional and international allies. The conflict has led to an estimated 4 600 fatalities, with approximately 1 200 000 civilians internally displaced, around half of which are children. The conflict has been characterised by gross human rights violations against civilians and has caused significant damage to infrastructure, disrupted critical service delivery, and negatively impacted economic activity.

Early responses to the conflict were exclusively military in nature, and these operations continue to be the dominant policy response by the government of Mozambique, with support from regional and international partners. Initially, this included the deployment of the Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM), and the Mozambican Police Service's Rapid Reaction Force (FIR), as well as the use of a series of private military companies. In early July 2021, a contingent of the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) and Rwandan National Police (RNP) was deployed to the region. On 15 July, following approval by the Extraordinary Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit of Heads of State and Government, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was deployed to Cabo Delgado. In addition, the European Union (EU) continues to provide training to Mozambican commandos and marines, under the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) while the US has increased the number of annual Joint Combined Exchange and Training (JCET) programmes between US Special

Operations Forces and Mozambican Special Forces to a biannual basis since 2021.

Since 2020, there have been increased efforts to address the northern region's developmental deficits, which are widely acknowledged as drivers of the conflict, as well as efforts to provide humanitarian and reconstruction support to the region. In March 2020, the government of Mozambique established the Integrated Development Agency of the North (ADIN), mandated to work across departments to promote and coordinate the implementation of policies and programmes aimed at reducing poverty and promoting sustainable economic growth in the three northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula. In August 2021, at the request of its international cooperation partners, the government developed the Cabo Delgado Reconstruction Plan (PRCD), outlining plans for providing humanitarian assistance and promoting long-term economic recovery. The PRCD requires an estimated budget of US\$300 million, of which so far US\$100 million has been secured.

There are several local and international civil society organisations currently implementing programmes aimed at addressing recruitment and radicalisation into violent extremism in Cabo Delgado. These programmes include educational and vocational training for vulnerable youth, platforms to promote interreligious dialogue and social cohesion, as well as strategic communications initiatives to build trust between communities and local government.

Stakeholders from across government, the security sector, civil society, and the religious community all recognise that military interventions alone will not create sustainable peace in Cabo Delgado and dialogue to transform the conflict is urgently needed. However, to date,

¹ The group is known by several names several names, including Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah (ASWJ), Ansar al-Sunnah, ISIS - Mozambique and al-Shabaab (though it has no direct connection to al-Shabaab in East Africa) or more locally known as Machababos.

there has not been a dialogue process which seeks to bring together the government, NSAG, and other critical stakeholders.

This report outlines the findings from a series of stakeholder consultations held between 27 January and 12 February 2023 in Maputo and Cabo Delgado. Its objective is to provide a situation report on the current state of the conflict and efforts to address it, as well as a preliminary analysis of opportunities for dialogue as a conflict transformation tool in the Cabo Delgado context.

The key findings are as follows:

- A readiness for peace dialogue across all sectors of society, both state and non-state.
- Several local community-led initiatives seek to address conflict and insecurity in Cabo Delgado. These have been primarily focused on reducing intercommunal tensions and strengthening social cohesion in specific regions of Cabo Delgado.
- Currently, there is no initiative seeking to bring the government and NSAG into a facilitated dialogue process, or a

coordinating platform able to perform multilevel engagement with all parties on a continued and non-partisan basis.

- Stakeholders expressed a significant trust deficit as a barrier to dialogue and peace.
- Stakeholders overwhelmingly expressed the value which a regionally anchored and non-aligned peace platform would provide to promoting peace at this moment in the conflict trajectory.
- There was an openness from both the provincial government and SAMIM for PAG to meaningfully contribute to the process of strengthening the response measures to the challenges facing Cabo Delgado.
- Engagements with representatives from the international community saw the unique added value the PAG initiative could provide to both national and regional peace efforts.



2. Stakeholder Engagements

NAME	ORGANISATION	SECTOR	DATE	LOCATION
Prof Adriano Nuvunga, Executive Director	Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD)	Civil Society	01/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Prof Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, Senior Lecturer	University of South Africa (UNISA)	Academia	01/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Prof Joao Feijo, Research Coordinator	Observatorio do Meio Rural (OMR)	Civil society	01/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Piers Pigou, Southern Africa Programme Director	Institute for Security Studies (ISS)	Think Tank	01/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Henk Son, CEO	Executive Logistics Mozambique	Private Security	01/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Matthew Lowe, Counsellor for Political and Economic Affairs	United States Embassy, Maputo	Diplomatic	02/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Otis Holloway, Stabilisation Advisor	United States Embassy, Maputo	Diplomatic	02/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Helen Pataki, Mission Director	USAID	Diplomatic	02/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Amb Mussagy	Retired Ambassador	Diplomatic	02/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Abudo Garfuro Manana	Civil Society Consortium	Civil Society	05/02/23	Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
Governor Valige Tauabo	Governor of Cabo Delgado	Provincial Government	06/02/2023	Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
Bishop Antonio Sandramo	Catholic Bishop of Pemba	Religious Community	06/02/2003	Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
Amb Prof Mpho Molomo, Head of Mission	SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)	Multilateral	06/02/2023	Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
	Civil Society Leaders	Civil Society	07/02/2023	Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
Antonio Supeia, Secretary of State, Cabo Delgado	Government of Mozambique	Provincial Government	07/02/2023	Cabo Delgado, Mozambique

Table 1: List of Stakeholder Engagements | 01 – 13 February 2023

(continues overleaf)

2. Stakeholder Engagements (cont.)

NAME	ORGANISATION	SECTOR	DATE	LOCATION
Manuela Cruz, Programme Officer	UN Human Rights Council	Humanitarian Sector	07/02/2023	Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
Julia Tatiana Wachavi	Women's Human Rights Lawyers	Civil Society	07/02/2003	Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
Maira Upinde, Permanent Secretary	Government of Mozambique	District Government	08/02/2023	Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
Meeting with IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons	Local Community	08/02/2023	Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
Rev Alberto Sabat, Inter-Religious Dialogue Coordinator	Religious Leaders	Religious Community	08/02/2023	Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
SAMIM Civilian Component	SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)	Multilateral	08/02/2023	Cabo Delgado, Mozambique
Amb Peter Vrooman, US Ambassador	Embassy of the United States, Maputo	Diplomatic	10/02/2003	Maputo, Mozambique
Amb Mette Sunnergren, Swedish Ambassador	Embassy of Sweden, Maputo	Diplomatic	10/02/2022	Maputo, Mozambique
Amb Elsbeth Akkerman, Netherlands Ambassador	Embassy of the The Netherlands, Maputo	Diplomatic	10/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Permanent Secretary Manuel Didier Malunga	Ministry of Justice	Government	10/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Catherine Gendre	Head of ICRC Mozambique	Humanitarian	10/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Sheikh Mussa Tamim	Muslim Council SG	Religious Community	11/2/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Hermenegildo Mulhovo, Executive Director	Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD)	Development Consultancy	11/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Carmen Munhequete, Senior Councillor	UNOPS	Multilateral	07/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Helen Pataki, Mission Director	USAID	Diplomatic	11/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
Amb Mussagy	Retired Ambassador	Diplomatic	11/02/2023	Maputo, Mozambique
President Khama	Peacemaking Advisory Group (PAG)	PAG, Eminent Person/ Advisor	13/02/2023	Johannesburg, South Africa

Table 1: List of Stakeholder Engagements | 01 – 13 February 2023



3. Current Size, Structure, and Strategy of the Non-State Armed Group

The Non-State Armed Group is estimated to be comprised of around 500 members² led by a ruling council, currently headed by Mozambican national Bonomade Machude Omar (Ibn Omar).³ Tanzanians represent the largest contingent of foreigners and fill a significant portion of the group's leadership positions. It is organised in a cell-like structure, with each cell headed by a commander. Each cell acts relatively autonomously, launching attacks on civilian and non-civilian targets. The group has also launched a limited number of attacks on strategic mining operations in the region.

The group does not currently seek to hold territory. Attacks on villages usually include the plundering of local food stocks, burning of huts and local infrastructure, as well as kidnapping of villagers, either to serve as fighters or for sex trafficking [Figure 1]. Attacks also include a high level of brutality, with regular beheadings and dismembering of victims which fighters are paid additional bonuses for carrying out. These attacks are likely intended to instil fear in local communities which the group perceive as aligned with the government, as well as in the various military forces opposing the group.

The Islamic State (IS) routinely praises attacks carried out by the group in Cabo Delgado through their media wing, however, there is no evidence to suggest that IS has any command and control over the group or significant levels of influence. While the group has managed to attract recruits from several Southern African states, and to receive some international funding, it is clearly rooted in the Cabo Delgado and Southern Tanzanian region, and exploiting largely localised inter-ethnic, intra-

religious, and socioeconomic tensions to its advantage.

To date, the group does not have a sophisticated communications strategy and made little effort to articulate a comprehensive ideological or political agenda. However, based on an analysis of video recordings taken by the group as well as survivors' testimonies, several common themes arise.

- A rejection of the local Islamic order as politically compromised and 'corrupted', and a call for the implementation of a strict form of sharia in the region, informed by a *Salafi* interpretation of Islam.
- The potential the group's interpretation of Islam offers in solving the myriad social and governance challenges common to the region, as well as the rejection of social and educational activities perceived as 'western influences.'
- A rejection of the Mozambican government and of participation in political activities.
- The framing of the group as defenders of the Mwani and coastal ethnic groups who have historically been economically and politically marginalised by a perceived tyrannical Maputo regime.
- The framing of natural resource extraction in the province as 'Southerners' exploiting and thereby marginalising local coastal ethnic groups.

Only a minority of the group is likely motivated in part or in full by a Salafi *jihadist* ideology. Militants who have been captured and interrogated are often on the brink of starvation, demonstrate little or no understanding of Islamic precepts, and admit to joining the group for payment or due to coercion.

² It is estimated that at the group's strongest it had over 2000 fighters. Given the vast size of the region which FADM and foreign troops are tasked with securing, even with 500 fighters, the group is able to carry out regular attacks, sometimes near-simultaneously, in different districts.

³ Abu Yasir Hassan formerly acted as overall leader of the group but has been recovering after being injured in a car accident. During this period, senior commander and attack coordinator within the group, Ibn Omar, has served as leader.

NAME	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	PLACE OF STUDY	DESIGNATION
Abu Sorraca Also known as: Bin Omar Bourno Mari Sulieman Abdala Mohammed Abdala Bonomade Machude Omar	Mozambique Allegedly has a Tanzanian passport	Kenya Zanzibar	Leader of the Group/ Operations Commander
Abu Yasir Hassan	Tanzania	Allegedly spent time in eastern DRC.	Spiritual Leader of the Group (possibly dead)
Haroon Farid Haroon	Mozambique	Pemba	Replaced Sorraca until he returned in 2022.
Sheik Muhamudu	Mozambique	Unknown	Senior Cell Leader
Sheik Ibrahim	Unknown	Unknown	Senior Cell Leader
Abu Faisal	Unknown	Unknown	Senior Cell Leader
Ahmed Sharif	Kenya	Unknown	Unknown
Sheikh Hasan Ali	Zanzibar	Unknown	Unknown
Musa	Kenya	Unknown	Unknown
Neru	Mozambique	Zanzibar	Unknown
Nordeen Ali	Tanzania	Unknown	Unknown
Sheikh Momadisa	Mozambique	Unknown	Unknown
Suleiman	Mozambique	Unknown	Unknown
MM	Mali	Unknown	Recruiter operating in Pemba marketplace
Abdula Rumani	Zanzibar	Zanzibar	Recruiter

Figure 1: Key Actors | February 2023

Financing

- Donations from supporters within the local business community via electronic money transfers
- Donations from international supporters via electronic money transfers
- Money lending by local businesses
- Protection money/extortion
- Securing transit routes for illicit smuggling networks
- Publicity and propaganda support from the Islamic State (IS) via IS's media wing
- Donations from international supporters via electronic money transfers
- Training to key commanders by the Islamic State-aligned faction of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the eastern DRC
- Suspected financial support and limited technical training by a member of an Islamic-State-aligned armed group in Somalia

Transnational connections

- Foreign fighters from Tanzania, Kenya, DRC, South Africa, and Somalia
- Familial and business ties to communities in southern Tanzania

Recruitment channels

- Familial ties
- Informal networks
- Local madrassas
- Messaging apps and social networks



Recruitment strategies

- Financial incentives
- Exploitation of perceived political marginalisation and predatory political elites
- Exploitation of local ethnic tensions
- Exploitation of local inter and intra-religious tensions


Weaponry

- AK47s, PKMs, RPG7s, 60, and 80mm mortars
- Bladed weapons: machetes, axes, knives, and sticks
- Limited use of improvised explosive devices and commercially available drones


Geographic spread

The group currently is organised in a cell-like structure, with each cell headed by a commander, and comprising anywhere between 10 to 50 militants. Each cell acts relatively autonomously under a commander, launching attacks on civilian and non-civilian targets, as well as on some strategic mining operations. Over the last six months, the group has pushed southward, launching attacks in Ancuabe and Chiure districts, and as far south as Nampula province, while also engaging in persistent attacks in the northern districts of Macomia, Nangade, and Muidumbe.

January 2021 - July 2021




July 2022 - February 2023



Data Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 2023.
Incidents shown are coded as violence against civilians, battles, explosions and remote violence.

Figure 2: Attack incidents before and after RDF and SAMIM deployments | Dec 2021 – Feb 2023 | Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. Left map indicates the number of attacks over a six-month period before the deployment of SAMIM. Right graphic shows the number of attacks one year one, over a six-month sample period.



Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 2023

Figure 3: Civilian deaths | Jan 2021 – Jan 2023 | Cabo Delgado, Mozambique.

4. Conflict Responses

The government of Mozambique’s framing of the conflict in Cabo Delgado has evolved, and with this change, there have been non-security responses to address certain underlying drivers of the conflict, as well as the humanitarian and developmental challenges in the region. These, however, have been limited and have not yet yielded concrete results.

4.1 National Security Responses

Initial attacks by the group were framed by the government as the work of ‘bandits’ and ‘criminals.’ Over time, as the frequency and severity of attacks continued, including the capture of the city of Mocimboa da Praia and attacks in Palma, the government began to publicly frame the group as a ‘terrorist’ organisation controlled by foreign influences. Recently, President Nyusi publicly recognised the leader of the group as a Mozambican national.

Initial responses to the group included mass arrests, strengthening of terrorism legislation, and the deployment of FADM to the region. Between 2019 - 2021, the government sought assistance from Private Military Contractors (PMCs) to strengthen its military intervention to contain the NSAG.

The following PMCs were utilised:

- The Wagner Group - was the first PMC to operate in Cabo Delgado, helping FADM to combat the insurgency. Between September and December 2019, Wagner soldiers were seen operating in Cabo Delgado.
- Dyck Advisory Group - after the withdrawal of Wagner - in April 2020 the Mozambican government hired the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) to provide air support for FADM and training. The contract expired in April 2021.
- The Paramount & Burnham Global consortium – a South African company specialising in providing technological




Figure 4: Internally Displaced Persons | February 2023 | Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. These figures are for IDPs during the month of February 2023. The total number of displaced persons since the conflict began is estimated at 1 200 000.

and security solutions for countries affected by armed conflicts. Unlike the Wagner Group and DAG, the military company does not supply private soldiers to governments, but military equipment including armoured vehicles, helicopters, training and strategic advice. On 23 February 2021, Burnham Global, a company based in Dubai and specialising in military training solutions was also claimed to have been contracted to supply military equipment and strategic advice.

In early 2021, the government of Mozambique entered into a bilateral security arrangement with Rwanda, and in early July 2021, a contingent of 2000 Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) and Rwandan National Police (RNP) were deployed to the region. Currently, there are over 2500 Rwandan forces present in Mozambique. On 15 July, following approval by the Extraordinary Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit of Heads of State and Government, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was deployed to Cabo Delgado. There

are currently 2000 SAMIM personnel present in Cabo Delgado.

The government has also been supportive of local communal militias, commonly referred to as Local Forces. They generally operate under their own command, with limited engagement with FADM or the police services. They do not receive salaries or military training but do receive ammunition, uniforms, and food supplies. Local Forces tend to have a higher degree of trust among local communities than foreign military forces and have had some military success against non-state armed groups. On December 15, the Mozambican parliament approved legislation granting legal status to communal militias. They will no longer be regarded as non-state actors but operate within a specific legal framework. While the Local Forces have played an important role in providing security where FADM and foreign military forces are stretched, their legalisation and gradual strengthening over time without adequate oversight could pose a significant challenge over the medium to long term.

4.2 Humanitarian and Development Interventions

To address the socio-economic dimension in Cabo Delgado, the government of Mozambique created an Integrated Development Agency for the North (ADIN) in August 2020 which is responsible for promoting economic and social development in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula.

ADIN's activities include infrastructure development, investment promotion, and support for small and medium-sized enterprises. The agency also works to improve access to basic services such as education, health, and water and sanitation in the region. The criticism raised by local experts is that the ADIN is geographically too broad and not inclusive of the local population in its structure.

To respond to the criticism toward ADIN and to attract investment from international

cooperation partners, the government of Mozambique decided on August 26, 2021, to launch the Cabo Delgado Reconstruction Plan (PRCD) which activities include:

- **Humanitarian response:** providing food, shelter, and other basic needs to people affected by violence and displacement.
- **Infrastructure reconstruction:** rebuilding homes, schools, hospitals, and other public facilities that have been destroyed or damaged by the violence.
- **Economic recovery:** promoting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as the tourism and agricultural sectors, to create jobs and boost the local economy.
- **Social services:** ensuring that people in the province have access to quality education, health care, and other essential services.
- **Security and stability:** working with security forces to maintain peace and stability in the province and to prevent further violence.
- **Governance and participation:** promoting good governance and citizen participation in the reconstruction process.

The plan is led by the government of Mozambique, with support from international partners such as the World Bank, UN agencies, and other international cooperation partners. The PRCD includes a special fund for reconstruction and development in the province, established by the Mozambican government. These initiatives by the Mozambican government can be partly attributed to the degree of stabilisation achieved through SAMIM's efforts to bring about an environment conducive to addressing the socio-economic concerns. The PRCD requires an estimated budget of US\$300 million, of which US\$100 million has been secured.



4.3 Regional and International Security Support

Rwanda

In July 2021, the RDF and the RNP Joint Force to Cabo Delgado deployed 1,000 soldiers and police officers to Cabo Delgado to help fight the insurgency. Currently, there are over 2500 Rwandans deployed to Mozambique. The RDF quickly made progress in recapturing towns and forcing the militants to disperse and implemented their successful concept of *umuganda* which involves working with residents in recaptured areas to improve infrastructure and stability. Schools in some areas have re-opened, and the French oil and gas major Total Energies are in the process of reviewing its decision to suspend its \$20 billion liquefied natural gas project. Despite the progress made, some experts and opposition groups in Mozambique have raised concerns about Rwanda's intervention and the reasons behind it. There are also concerns about Rwanda's human rights record and its treatment of political opponents. Despite generating some controversy in civil society, the mission is seen as having been militarily effective, with Rwandan soldiers having the advantage of being able to communicate with the local population in Swahili, as well as being well armed and trained. The European Union has committed 20 million euros to support the Rwandan mission.

SAMIM

On 15 July 2021, following approval by the Extraordinary Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit of Heads of State and Government, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was deployed to Cabo Delgado. In September 2022, it was made public that the mission will, drawing from the African Union Peace Support Operations (AU PSO) scenario guide, make the transition from a Scenario Six – full military approach – to Scenario Five – a multidimensional deployment with soldiers working alongside police, corrections officers, and civilians.

COUNTRY	TROOP NUMBERS
Angola	20 Personnel and an Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft – July 2021
Botswana	296 Personnel – July 2021
Lesotho	125 Personnel airlifted by an Angolan Air Force Ilyushin Il-76 transport – August 2021
Namibia	8 Officers – March 2022
South Africa	1495 Personnel – July 2021
Tanzania	274 Personnel – August 2021
TOTAL	2218

Table 1: SAMIM Troop Contributing Countries | February 2023

CIVILIAN COMPONENT				
Name	Position	Nationality	Appointed	Status
Prof. Mpho Molomo	Head of Mission	Botswana	15 July 2021	Incumbent
Kingstone Mazuba	Head of Civilian Component	Zambia	November 2022	Incumbent

MILITARY COMPONENT				
Maj. Gen. Xolani Mankayi	Force Commander	South Africa	15 July 2021	Incumbent
Brigadier Dumisani Ndzinge	Deputy Force Commander	Botswana	15 July 2021	8 February 2022
Brigadier Simon Barwabatsile	Deputy Force Commander	Botswana	8 February 2022	Incumbent

Table 2: SAMIM Command Structure | February 2023

The European Union

In November 2022, the European Union launched the European Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM). EUTM Mozambique is intended to support the capacity building of the units of the Mozambican armed forces selected to compose a future Quick Reaction Force, for them to develop the necessary and sustainable capacities to restore safety and security in Cabo Delgado. To this end, the mission will provide training to 11 companies in operational preparation; specialised training, including on counterterrorism; training and education on the protection of civilians and compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law; the promotion of the agenda Women, Peace and Security.

The United States

In 2021, the US sought to strengthen its bilateral security cooperation with Mozambique by increasing the number of annual Joint Combined Exchange and Training (JCET) programmes between US Special Operations Forces and Mozambican Special Forces on a biannual basis. The Department of Defence has also provided tactical combat casualty care and combat lifesaver training courses for the Mozambican armed forces in 2021 and 2022. Mozambique also participated in the second multinational maritime exercise Cutlass Express in January 2022 and continues to participate in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme.



5. Conclusions: opportunities for dialogue and critical issues on the way forward

After five years of insecurity, there is a deep sense of conflict fatigue in Cabo Delgado. There is also a clear understanding among the stakeholders which the PAG engaged across government, the diplomatic community, civil society, the religious community, and the private sector that military interventions in isolation will not end the conflict, will not bring sustainable peace, and will not unlock the province's vast development potential.

The absence of a government-convened dialogue process which seeks to bring together representatives of NSAG and the government to explore the potential for conflict transformation is generally recognised as a matter that needs to be addressed with utmost urgency. However, several critical issues continue to act as barriers to such a process, including a deep trust deficit between key stakeholders, a lack of coordination and communication between relevant parties, and complex questions around amnesty and the reintegration of former fighters.

None of these issues is insurmountable and should be overcome to bring about peace in Cabo Delgado. Examples from the continent and further afield show that violent extremism cannot be defeated by military means alone.

Based on PAG's multisector stakeholder consultations, work will continue towards establishing and operationalising a *peace indaba* aimed at facilitating dialogue towards conflict transformation in Cabo Delgado. To this end, the next phase of the programme of activities of the PAG will include the following:

- Engaging key stakeholders in the eastern and southern African region.
- Engaging government at national, provincial, and local levels.
- Engaging non-state stakeholders at national, provincial, and local levels.
- Begin to address the trust deficit in Cabo Delgado through the creation of a safe and non-partisan platform for discussion and consultation between critical stakeholders.
- Deepen research and understanding of conflict dynamics.
- Develop a set of context-specific policy frameworks, on critical issues relating to the transformation of the conflict, such as amnesty, reintegration, reconciliation, and inclusive economic policy reform.

The PAG will initiate these actions as a matter of urgency, in full consultations with all stakeholders involved.

